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appreciation  of  the  exchange rate  in  the  presence  of  capital  inflows.  To 
represent  this  process,  let  the  rate  of  increase of  home-good  prices,  p,  be 
proportional  to the excess of expenditures  over income, as captured by  the 
current account deficit B: 
(A2.1)  p  = OB. 
Now the expected rate of inflation has an additional component coming from 
the dynamics of p: 
(A2.2) 
Using this, we can calculate the impact effect of Ag  on the current account 
as follows: 
7i = pi + (1 - p)& 
(A2.3)  b(O)=  -{1/(1  - a[pA  + (1 -  p)O])}Ag, 
which  is greater  due to expectations  of  higher  inflation.  The dynamics  of 
debt are in turn determined by: 
(A2.4)  dF/dF = {1/(1 - a[pA + (1 - p)O])}(q*  - P(A - 0)). 
Once again, the stable region for A  is smaller. In other words,  incorporating 
the  dynamics  of  the  nontraded  sector  makes  instability  more  likely  and 
exchange rate management more problematic. 
3  Crisis Without Adjustment, 
1978  -79 
The debt crisis developing in mid-1977 threw Turkey into a period of  forced 
adjustment. As foreign exchange sources dried up, external balance became 
for the first time in many years a genuinely binding constraint,  requiring an 
adjustment in the relation  between  income and absorption in the economy. 
Until the reform  package of January  1980, the policies employed by  the 
authorities  were  unsuccessful  in  extricating  the Turkish  economy  from  the 
crisis. In view of  the foreign exchange constraint, some belt-tightening had 
become  inescapable.  However,  the  governments  in  power  during  this 
period-and  there were many-compounded  the problems by their refusal to 
implement vigorous  adjustment measures.  The investment boom collapsed, 
economic  growth  came  crashing  down,  inflation  rose  to  unprecedented 
heights,  and  income  distribution  worsened  disastrously.  The only  positive 
development was the beginning of a series of debt reschedulings with official 656  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
and  private  creditors,  to  be  discussed  in  chapter  9,  which  eased  the 
debt-service burden considerably. 
In  the  present  chapter  we  provide  an  interpretation  of  the  immediate 
aftermath  of  the  debt  crisis.  Our  argument  will  be  that  a  collapse  in 
investment and an inflationary spiral were the key mechanisms enabling the 
required adjustment to the external constraint to be achieved. In the absence 
of  sufficient reductions  in  nominal  expenditures and  of  real  exchange rate 
depreciations,  absorption  could  be  brought  in  line  with  the  available 
resources  only  by  engineering  inflation.  Inflation,  in  turn,  had  severe 
consequences on  income  distribution,  as  real  wages  and  the  agricultural 
terms  of  trade  eroded.  Meanwhile,  it  created  windfall  gains  for  the 
entrepreneurs who had borrowed prior to the crisis, by effectively validating 
their expectations. The lack of  serious adjustment  measures had a high cost 
in terms of both foregone output and distributional  objectives. What follows 
can  be  read  as  a  cautionary  tale  regarding  the  consequences of  ignoring 
accounting identities. 
3.1  Government Policies and Inflation 
The immediate  consequence of  the  debt crisis  was  a  foreign  exchange 
shortage, as foreign inflows slowed to a trickle.  That meant that the current 
account deficits had to come down. As table 2.1 showed, the deficit of  $1.6 
billion  in  1978 was less than half that of  1977 ($3.4 billion), and a further 
cut to $1.2 billion  took place in  1979. 
How were these cuts achieved? Policy  itself  was of  little help. The IMF 
was called on to administer a series of  stabilization programs, and two sets 
of  adjustment measures were announced, one in early 1978 and the other in 
1979.  These  programs  aimed  at  reducing  the  public  sector  deficits  and 
improving  the  foreign  exchange  outlook.  They  included  devaluations, 
increases in prices of  SEES, and credit ceilings. But both programs, as well 
as the two corresponding  IMF standby  arrangements, proved  unsuccessful. 
Until  January  1980, the  various  adjustment  measures  undertaken  by  the 
authorities  can be  aptly  described  as  having  been  too little,  too late. The 
reduction in government spending was only half-hearted, ' and exchange rate 
policy,  albeit more active, lagged behind  rising  inflation. The governments 
in power were too conscious of  political support to administer radical shock 
treatment and too divided to implement any feasible alternative. 
The first casualty  of  the  shortage of  foreign  exchange was  investment, 
which  dropped  sharply  as  the  availability  of  imported  inputs  and  capital 
goods  became  problematic.  In  fact,  the  primary  vehicle  for  reducing 
dependence  on  foreign  inflows was this reduction  in capital  formation. As 
table 3.1 shows, the aggregate investment ratio collapsed from 25.0 percent 
of GNP in  1977 to 18.5 percent in  1978, and then to 18.3 percent  in  1979. 
The public  sector investment  ratio declined  to levels not  experienced since 657  TurkeylChapter 3 
Table 3.1  Investment-Savings  Balance and Growth of Real Expenditures, 1978-80 
1978  1979  1980 
Investment  18.5  18.3  21.4 
Private  9.1  8.8  9.9 
Public  9.5  9.5  11.5 
Domestic savings  15.9  16.2  15.9 
Private  10.6  13.5  10.6 
Public  5.3  2.7  5.3 
Foreign savings  2.6  2.  I  5.5 
Sectoral savings-investment balances 
Private  1.5  4.7  0.7 
Public  -4.2  -6.8  -6.2 
Total  -2.7  -2.1  -5.5 
Private  0.0  -3.4  -  1.3 
Public  -2.9  4.0  3.6 
Total  -0.7  -  1.6  -0.1 
Growth of real expenditures 
Source: SPO. 
Nofe: Investment-savings  balance  data  reported as  a  percentage  of  GNP.  Growth  of  real  expenditures 
excludes expenditures on inventories and is reported in percentages. 
1974.  But  public  savings  also  declined  as  a  result  of  the  adverse 
consequences of inflation on the tax revenues of the government. As a result, 
the public sector savings-investment balance improved in  1978 by  only 2.5 
percentage points, only to deteriorate in 1979 to a level below that of  1977. 
The public sector borrowing requirement remained at 7.9 and 8.9 percent (of 
GNP) in 1978 and  1979, respectively. This was lower than the record 10.6 
percent of  1977, but was worse than the performance during 1974-76  (see 
table 2.6). The bulk of  the burden fell on the private sector, in which the 
savings-investment balance turned positive for the first time since 1975 and 
rose to 4.7 percent of GNP in 1979. 
The lack  of  serious adjustment on  the part  of  the public  sector is  also 
visible  from  the  figures  on  growth  of  real  expenditures.  The  investment 
collapse  of  1978  was  associated  with  a  real  contraction  of  public 
expenditures in  1978, but  such expenditures resumed their growth in  1979 
and thereafter, albeit at much reduced levels compared to the mid-1970s (see 
tables 2.6 and 3.1). By  contrast, the real expenditures of  the private sector 
stagnated in  1978 and then fell for a number of  consecutive years. By  1979 
the  public  sector had  regained  its  1977 level  of  expenditures; the private 
sector would have to wait until  1984 for the same to happen. 
The various governments’ lack of  resolve in  expenditure reduction  was 
equally evident in their expenditure-switching policies. A series of nominal 
devaluations of  increasing  magnitude  was  undertaken,  but  these  proved 
ineffective  in arresting the  deterioration in competitiveness.  As figure 2.1 
showed, after a small depreciation in 1978, the real exchange rate appreciated 658  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
sharply in 1979  as nominal adjustments failed to keep pace with inflation. The 
authorities also experimented with other schemes. An  attempt was made to 
increase workers’ remittances by giving them more favorable exchange rates. 
The effective subsidy rate on exports was increased by expanding tax rebates 
and allowing some retention of foreign exchange by exporters. While export 
receipts  and remittances  rose  in response  to these  incentives, much  of  the 
adjustment burden still fell on  imports. 
In the end, foreign exchange was rationed  not  by  price, but  administra- 
tively.  The authorities  progressively  reduced  travel  allowances for Turkish 
tourists  going abroad,  and  allocated  the  scarce supplies according to  the 
perceived  needs  of  various  importers.  The black-market  premium on  the 
dollar rose as high as 91.4 percent  at the end of the first quarter of  1979.2 
Widespread  shortages of  imported commodities developed. 
The consequence of  all  this  was  a  rise  in  the  rate of  inflation.  In  the 
presence  of  an effective ceiling on external borrowing  opportunities and a 
lack of sufficient restraint on nominal expenditures, real absorption could be 
brought in line with the available resources only by creating inflation. In this 
sense, it was inflation which equilibrated the open-economy national income 
identity,  by closing the gap between ex ante demand and supply. Normally, 
inflation  would have had adverse consequences on the external  balance by, 
among other things,  appreciating  the real exchange rate. While, as pointed 
out above, the appreciation did take place, its effects on the current account 
were insulated by  direct controls on the allocation  of foreign exchange and 
by  rationing.  In  the  meantime, rising  prices undercut  the  real  purchasing 
power of  large segments of the population  with  “sticky”  nominal  incomes 
(on  which  more  later).  Inflation  here  was  not  the  problem  but  the 
“solution.” 
Another  way  of  observing this  is through  the perspective  of  the flow of 
funds.  A  given  credit  expansion  in  the  economy  gives  rise  to  a  larger 
expansion of  monetary aggregates, and hence greater inflation, when leakage 
through the balance of payments is excluded. The figures from the balance 
sheet of the monetary authorities (table 3.2) show clearly that that is indeed 
what ha~pened.~  In the 1974-77  period, the accumulating external liabilities 
of  the  central  bank  (including CTLDs)  discussed  above  amounted  to  a 
staggering 116.2 percent decline in net foreign assets (in annual terms). With 
the central bank cut off  from foreign funds after 1977, no such decline took 
Table 3.2  Annual Average Growth Rates (in percentages) 
End-1974 to End-1977  End-1977 to End-1979 
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place  in  1977-79.  The consequence  was  that a smaller rate of  increase in 
domestic  credit  in  1977-79,  principally  to the  public  sector,  had  a larger 
eventual effect on base money.4 This also provides an answer to the puzzle 
arising  from the  existence  of  an  inflationary  tide  in  a period  in  which  the 
PSBR and public recourse to the central bank were modest compared to  the 
heights reached in  1977. 
Inflation,  then,  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  adjustment  process  which 
achieved the drastic reductions  in the current  account  deficits  of  1978 and 
1979.  This  process  of  adjustment  via  inflation  is  reminiscent  of  Albert 
Hirschman’s  analysis  of  the  politics  of  inflation  in  the  Latin  American 
context: “Where the state defers readily to all the successive demands made 
on it by one group or one government department after another, inflation has 
the function of  denying part of  what the state, in its weakness, has granted. 
. . . [Tlhe state might be said to hand over to inflation the disagreeable job 
of  saying no”  (1985, 73).5 In  the  same vein,  the Turkish  governments  of 
1978-79  handed  over  to  inflation  the  disagreeable  job  of  cutting  real 
expenditures. 
The close  association  between  the  current  account  and  inflation  can be 
seen from the evidence on prices portrayed  in figure 3.1. Hence, it is clear 
that  inflation  started  to take  off  in  the  second  half  of  1977, just  as new 
borrowing opportunities were becoming extinct as a result of the developing 
crisis.  This  was  the  period  when  foreign  exchange  shortages  first  made 
themselves felt, with  a consequent  scarcity of  imported inputs. The rate of 
increase in wholesale prices  reached 52.6 percent  in  1978, 63.9 percent  in 
1979, and culminated in  107.2 percent  in  1980 before it was brought under 
control (see table 2.1). The peak of inflation in  1980 came at the same time 
as  the  relaxation  of  the  external  constraint,  which  could  be  viewed  as 
contradicting  the  thesis  here.  But  the  high  rate  of  inflation  in  1980 was 
largely  a validation  of  price  increases  which had  already effectively  taken 
place in black markets, and which became reflected in official statistics once 
price controls were lifted in January  1980. 
3.2  The Distributional Implications of Adjustment via Inflation 
Figure  3.1  shows  the  relatively  large  divergence  in  price  trends  for 
industrial and raw  materials on the one hand, and food  items on the other. 
The first category was affected by the foreign exchange shortage to a greater 
extent  since  its  import  content  is  much  higher.  As  very  little  food  is 
imported, food prices  were determined  by domestic  agricultural conditions 
plus domestic support payments by the government. These support payments 
were in turn eroded by inflation, with the consequence that the industrial and 
raw  materials index rose more rapidly  than the food index. 
As these trends suggest, the unwitting changes in the structure of relative 
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Fig. 3.1 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Turkey, April  1980. 
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In an economy like Turkey’s, there are two key  relative prices determining 
the relative share of  various groups in national income. The first of these is 
the agricultural sector’s terms of trade with the rest of the economy, which is 
a rough but good indicator of  the rural-urban split. The second is the real 
wage,  which  is  an  indicator  of  distribution  within  urban  areas  between 
workers  and  others.  With  neither  of  these  indicators  was  the  Turkish 
experience after 1977 a happy one. Figure 3.2 displays the trends in both of 
these relative prices, together with the trends in aggregate real income and 
expenditure for purposes of comparison. 
The evidence on the agricultural terms of trade shows the consequence of 
the price trends discussed briefly above. After a cumulative improvement of 
24  percent  between  1970 and  1977, the  terms  of  trade declined  sharply 
thereafter. Within the time span of two years (1978-79),  a reduction of  23 
percent brought the level to below where it had been in  1970. There was a 
further  fall  of  around  4  percent  in  1980,  the  effects  of  inflation  being 
partially offset in that year by  a large real depreciation of the currency.6 
The fall in  real wages was even more drastic. While the nominal wage 
data used in constructing the real wage series are problematic in that they do 
not include bonuses and fringe benefits, the evidence portrayed in figure 3.2 
is sufficiently telling. Once again, the collapse comes right after 1977 and is 
the consequence of nominal wage contracts which did not fully anticipate the 
coming inflation. Between  1972 and  1977 real  wages had  increased by  32 
percent.  After  1977 real  wages  fell  almost in  the  same proportion  as  the 
rising inflation: by  12 percent in  1978, 14 percent in  1979, and a stupefying 
2501 
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Fig. 3.2  Real income, real expenditures, real wages, and agricultural terms 
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25 percent  in  1980, bringing the cumulative  reduction  in  three years to 43 
percent. 
The worsening of income distribution in this period was the consequence of 
inflationary pressures being reflected in contract prices (such as wages) only 
with a lag whereas other prices could adjust freely.  ironically,  the resulting 
relative-price structure would be maintained and consolidated in the post- 1980 
period of adjustment. As will be discussed at greater length in the following 
two  chapters,  the  inflationary  episode  of  1977-80  had  disturbing  effects 
which outlasted this period. 
3.3  Concluding Remarks 
Was there an alternative? Given the necessary retrenchment on the current 
account, it was inevitable after 1977 that real expenditures would have had to 
be cut somewhat. Instead, the authorities acted as if the crisis might go away 
if ignored, setting off an inflationary spiral which eroded the real incomes of 
the  poorest  segments  of  Turkish  society.  A  series  of  bold  measures  of 
expenditure reduction and expenditure switching early on in the game might 
have enabled the economy to avoid some of the worst excesses of adjustment 
via  inflation.  In  the  event,  letting  inflation  do  the  job  of  cutting  real 
expenditures  proved  a  very  costly  method  compared  to  the  obvious 
alternative of  reducing nominal spending itself.  In any case, the policies of 
the  1978-79  period did not seriously tackle any of the underlying problems 
of  the economy, and they were incapable of promoting recovery.  The latter 
would have to wait for the  1980s. 
4  Stabilization and Adjustment 
Policies,  1980- 85 
As  described  in  the  earlier  chapters,  Turkey  became  the  first  major 
developing country debtor to face a deep payments  crisis in  the  post-1973 
period.  Because  of  the  poorly  managed  macroeconomic  environment  and 
massive short-term borrowing, Turkey’s debt rout arrived early in mid- 1977 
before  the second oil shock of  the  late  1970s. A heavy reliance on import 
compression in combination with unrestrained nominal expenditures resulted 
in an inflationary  slowdown of  growth during  1978-79.  The accompanying 
shortages  in  commodity  supplies  produced  wide  public  discontent.  The 
unsuccessful  implementation of  the IMF standby arrangements also strained 